Benchmark Almanac

Voice persuasion study on party preferences

GPT-4o May 2024 5.74% Only in system cards

Participants hear model-voiced audio clips or talk with a voiced model. Scored on shifts in hypothetical party preference against human baselines.

Human participant study with over 3,800 respondents and a one-week follow-up.

Made by OpenAI Released Aug 2024 Dangerous capabilities Tasks kept private Last in a system card Aug 2024 Last model added Aug 2024
Level
Everyday Most adults, without training
Scored
Settled by events Predictions are scored against what later happens.
Answers
Open-ended Free-form text, documents, designs or media judged as a whole.
1
Model scored in lab cards
1
System card reports it, from 1 lab

GPT-4o leads with 5.74%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 GPT-4o May 2024 5.74%
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 GPT-4o May 2024 5.74% Aug 2024 Model card

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Near the ceiling (85%) GPT-4o 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Near the ceiling (85%) GPT-4o

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

One system card reports it

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
8 Aug 2024 GPT-4o system card 5.74 Effect sizes of voice interventions on hypothetical party preferences, AI interactive conversations, immediate effect size (printed chart label, 3.7); AI static audio 6.08%, 65% and 78% of human effect sizes Persuasion

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