Llama verbatim memorization probe (Meta)
Only in system cards
Models get prompts sampled from their pretraining data. The score is the share of generations that reproduce the true continuation verbatim.
In-house Meta measurement on pretrained models, reported for several prompt and continuation lengths.
Made by Meta Released Jul 2024 Refusing harmful requests Tasks kept private Last in a system card Nov 2024
Last model added Nov 2024
- Scored
- Checked automatically A program checks the result against an answer key, unit tests or the expected final state.
- Answers
- Short answer A number, word or short string matched to a key.
3
System cards report it, from 1 lab
No scores here yet
No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for Llama verbatim memorization probe (Meta) yet.
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
3 system cards report it, from 1 lab
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 23 Nov 2024 |  Llama 3.1-8B technical report | Average verbatim memorization, pretrained, three scenarios with no overall (Table 24): English 50-gram 0.26%, All 50-gram 0.24%, All 1000-gram 1.11% | Safety | |
| 23 Nov 2024 | Llama 3.1-70B technical report | Average verbatim memorization, pretrained, three scenarios with no overall (Table 24): English 50-gram 0.60%, All 50-gram 0.55%, All 1000-gram 3.56% | Safety | |
| 23 Nov 2024 | Llama 3.1-405B technical report | Average verbatim memorization, pretrained, three scenarios with no overall (Table 24): English 50-gram 1.13%, All 50-gram 1.03%, All 1000-gram 3.91% | Safety |
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