Benchmark Almanac

TrustLLM JailbreakTrigger

Olmo 3.1 32B Think 86.4% Only in system cards

Models face 400 prompts that apply 13 jailbreak methods to questions about bad behavior and requests for toxic content. Scored by refusal rate.

TrustLLM lists it as the jailbreak part of its safety dimension. Ai2 reports it in its Tulu 3 and Olmo safety suites.

In the authors’ words

Large language models (LLMs), exemplified by ChatGPT, have gained considerable attention for their excellent natural language processing capabilities. Nonetheless, these LLMs present many challenges, particularly in the realm of trustworthiness. Therefore, ensuring the trustworthiness of LLMs emerges as an important topic. This paper introduces TrustLLM, a comprehensive study of trustworthiness in LLMs, including principles for different dimensions of trustworthiness, established benchmark, evaluation, and analysis of trustworthiness for mainstream LLMs, and discussion of open challenges and future directions. Specifically, we first propose a set of principles for trustworthy LLMs that span eight different dimensions. Based on these principles, we further establish a benchmark across six dimensions including truthfulness, safety, fairness, robustness, privacy, and machine ethics. We then present a study evaluating 16 mainstream LLMs in TrustLLM, consisting of over 30 datasets. Our findings firstly show that in general trustworthiness and utility (i.e., functional effectiveness) are positively related. Secondly, our observations reveal that proprietary LLMs generally outperform most open-source counterparts in terms of trustworthiness, raising concerns about the potential risks of widely accessible open-source LLMs. However, a few open-source LLMs come very close to proprietary ones. Thirdly, it is important to note that some LLMs may be overly calibrated towards exhibiting trustworthiness, to the extent that they compromise their utility by mistakenly treating benign prompts as harmful and consequently not responding. Finally, we emphasize the importance of ensuring transparency not only in the models themselves but also in the technologies that underpin trustworthiness. Knowing the specific trustworthy technologies that have been employed is crucial for analyzing their effectiveness.

Abstract of TrustLLM: Trustworthiness in Large Language Models (arXiv:2401.05561, CC0)
Made by TrustLLM team (Yue Huang, Lichao Sun and others) Released Jan 2024 Jailbreaks and prompt injection All tasks public Last in a system card Dec 2025 Last model added Dec 2025
Level
Everyday Most adults, without training
Scored
Graded by a model A language model scores each response, usually against a rubric.
Answers
Open-ended Free-form text, documents, designs or media judged as a whole.
2
Models scored in lab cards
2
System cards report it, from 1 lab

Olmo 3.1 32B Think leads with 86.4%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Olmo 3.1 32B Think 86.4%
  2. 2 Olmo 3 32B Think 73.3%
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Olmo 3.1 32B Think 86.4% Dec 2025 Model card
2 Olmo 3 32B Think 73.3% Dec 2025 Model card

The best score passed 85% in Dec 2025

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2026 Near the ceiling (85%) Olmo 3.1 32B Think 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2026 Near the ceiling (85%) Olmo 3.1 32B Think

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

2 system cards report it, from 1 lab

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
15 Dec 2025 Olmo 3 32B Think technical report 73.3 TrustLLM-JailbreakTrigger, refusal accuracy, Final Think 3.0 column (Table 54) Safety
15 Dec 2025 Olmo 3.1 32B Think technical report 86.4 TrustLLM-JailbreakTrigger, refusal accuracy, Final Think 3.1 column (Table 54) Safety

More in Safety and alignment

All 444 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
  • MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy. Muse Spark Open 98.1%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. GPT-6 Astra 8.50%
  • Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%