Benchmark Almanac

ToxiGen (discriminative)

Phi-4-reasoning 85.5% Only in system cards

Models label statements about 13 minority groups as toxic or neutral. Scored by accuracy, often split into toxic and neutral labels.

Microsoft Phi reports run it through Eureka ML Insights. Other labs use ToxiGen prompts to measure toxic generations instead.

In the authors’ words

Toxic language detection systems often falsely flag text that contains minority group mentions as toxic, as those groups are often the targets of online hate. Such over-reliance on spurious correlations also causes systems to struggle with detecting implicitly toxic language. To help mitigate these issues, we create ToxiGen, a new large-scale and machine-generated dataset of 274k toxic and benign statements about 13 minority groups. We develop a demonstration-based prompting framework and an adversarial classifier-in-the-loop decoding method to generate subtly toxic and benign text with a massive pretrained language model. Controlling machine generation in this way allows ToxiGen to cover implicitly toxic text at a larger scale, and about more demographic groups, than previous resources of human-written text. We conduct a human evaluation on a challenging subset of ToxiGen and find that annotators struggle to distinguish machine-generated text from human-written language. We also find that 94.5% of toxic examples are labeled as hate speech by human annotators. Using three publicly-available datasets, we show that finetuning a toxicity classifier on our data improves its performance on human-written data substantially. We also demonstrate that ToxiGen can be used to fight machine-generated toxicity as finetuning improves the classifier significantly on our evaluation subset. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/ToxiGen.

Abstract of ToxiGen: A Large-Scale Machine-Generated Dataset for Adversarial and Implicit Hate Speech Detection (arXiv:2203.09509, CC0)
Made by Microsoft Research + MIT (Hartvigsen et al.) Released Mar 2022 Bias, fairness and politics All tasks public Last in a system card Apr 2025 Last model added Apr 2025
Level
Everyday Most adults, without training
Scored
Checked automatically A program checks the result against an answer key, unit tests or the expected final state.
Answers
Multiple choice
2
Models scored in lab cards
2
System cards report it, from 1 lab

Phi-4-reasoning leads with 85.5%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Phi-4-reasoning 85.5%
  2. 2 Phi-4-Reasoning-plus 85%
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Phi-4-reasoning 85.5% Apr 2025 Model card
2 Phi-4-Reasoning-plus 85% Apr 2025 Model card

The best score passed 85% in Apr 2025

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2025 Near the ceiling (85%) Phi-4-reasoning 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2025 Near the ceiling (85%) Phi-4-reasoning

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

2 system cards report it, from 1 lab

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
30 Apr 2025 Phi-4-reasoning technical report 85.5 Toxigen discriminative, aggregate accuracy (Figure 18a), Table 2 gives toxic 86.7 and neutral 84.7 Bias
30 Apr 2025 Phi-4-Reasoning-plus technical report 85 Toxigen discriminative, aggregate accuracy (Figure 18a), Table 2 gives toxic 77.3 and neutral 90.5 Bias

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