SALAD-Bench
Models answer harmful questions organized in a three-level taxonomy, some with attack or defense changes and some multiple-choice. The MD-Judge evaluator labels responses as safe or unsafe.
ACL 2024 Findings paper.
In the authors’ words
In the rapidly evolving landscape of Large Language Models (LLMs), ensuring robust safety measures is paramount. To meet this crucial need, we propose SALAD-Bench, a safety benchmark specifically designed for evaluating LLMs, attack, and defense methods. Distinguished by its breadth, SALAD-Bench transcends conventional benchmarks through its large scale, rich diversity, intricate taxonomy spanning three levels, and versatile functionalities.SALAD-Bench is crafted with a meticulous array of questions, from standard queries to complex ones enriched with attack, defense modifications and multiple-choice. To effectively manage the inherent complexity, we introduce an innovative evaluators: the LLM-based MD-Judge for QA pairs with a particular focus on attack-enhanced queries, ensuring a seamless, and reliable evaluation. Above components extend SALAD-Bench from standard LLM safety evaluation to both LLM attack and defense methods evaluation, ensuring the joint-purpose utility. Our extensive experiments shed light on the resilience of LLMs against emerging threats and the efficacy of contemporary defense tactics. Data and evaluator are released under https://github.com/OpenSafetyLab/SALAD-BENCH.
- Level
- Everyday Most adults, without training
- Scored
- Graded by a model A language model scores each response, usually against a rubric.
- Answers
- Open-ended Free-form text, documents, designs or media judged as a whole.
Granite 4.0 H Small leads with 97.3% among models released by Apr 2026
Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.
The newest model with a score here came out in Apr 2026, and nobody has reported a newer one. Among the 20 highest-ranked models on the capability index, these have no score yet:
- GPT-6 Astra
- Claude Opus 5.5
- GPT-6.1 Terra
- GPT-6.1 Sol
- and 16 more
- 1 Granite 4.0 H Small 97.3%
- 2 Granite 4.1 30B 96.4%
- 3 granite-4.0-1b 93.4%
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Granite 4.0 H Small | 97.3% | Oct 2025 | Model card | |
| 2 | Granite 4.1 30B | 96.4% | Apr 2026 | Model card | |
| 3 | granite-4.0-1b | 93.4% | Oct 2025 | Model card |
Number one over time
Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.
The best score passed 85% in Oct 2025
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Labs headline it less often now, last in Apr 2026
Launch posts from every lab that has listed it, one tick per post. Tall colored ticks include it, and short gray ones leave it out.
| Date | Launch post | Score | As the post writes it |
|---|---|---|---|
| 29 Apr 2026 | Granite 4.1 30B | 96.4 | SALAD-Bench |
| 28 Oct 2025 | granite-4.0-1b | 93.4 | SALAD-Bench |
| 2 Oct 2025 | Granite 4.0 H Small | 97.3 | SALAD-Bench |
One system card reports it
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 Jan 2026 | | SALAD Bench safe rate, CoT+Answer, three sets with no overall: attack enhanced 97.86, defense enhanced 99.5, base 98.6 (Table 10) | Safety |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6%
- AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
- MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy.
Muse Spark Open 98.1%
- Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. GPT-6 Astra 8.50%
- Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%