Benchmark Almanac

RTVLM

Phi-4-multimodal 6.39 Only in system cards

Vision language models answer red-teaming image prompts on faithfulness, privacy, safety and fairness. GPT-4V scores responses from 0 to 10.

In the authors’ words

VLMs (Vision-Language Models) extend the capabilities of LLMs (Large Language Models) to accept multimodal inputs. Since it has been verified that LLMs can be induced to generate harmful or inaccurate content through specific test cases (termed as Red Teaming), how VLMs perform in similar scenarios, especially with their combination of textual and visual inputs, remains a question. To explore this problem, we present a novel red teaming dataset RTVLM, which encompasses 10 subtasks (e.g., image misleading, multi-modal jail-breaking, face fairness, etc) under 4 primary aspects (faithfulness, privacy, safety, fairness). Our RTVLM is the first red-teaming dataset to benchmark current VLMs in terms of these 4 different aspects. Detailed analysis shows that 10 prominent open-sourced VLMs struggle with the red teaming in different degrees and have up to 31% performance gap with GPT-4V. Additionally, we simply apply red teaming alignment to LLaVA-v1.5 with Supervised Fine-tuning (SFT) using RTVLM, and this bolsters the models' performance with 10% in RTVLM test set, 13% in MM-Hal, and without noticeable decline in MM-Bench, overpassing other LLaVA-based models with regular alignment data. This reveals that current open-sourced VLMs still lack red teaming alignment. Our code and datasets will be open-source.

Abstract of Red Teaming Visual Language Models (arXiv:2401.12915, CC0)
Made by Li et al. (HKU, Peking University and others) Released Jan 2024 Refusing harmful requests All tasks public Last in a system card Mar 2025 Last model added Mar 2025
Level
Everyday Most adults, without training
Scored
Graded by a model A language model scores each response, usually against a rubric.
Answers
Open-ended Free-form text, documents, designs or media judged as a whole.
2
Models scored in lab cards
2
System cards report it, from 1 lab

Phi-4-multimodal leads with 6.39

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Phi-4-multimodal 6.39
  2. 2 Phi-3.5-vision-instruct 5.44
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Phi-4-multimodal 6.39 Mar 2025 Model card
2 Phi-3.5-vision-instruct 5.44 Aug 2024 Model card

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
5.50 5.75 6.00 6.25 2025 5.50 5.75 6.00 6.25 2025

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

2 system cards report it, from 1 lab

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
3 Mar 2025 Phi-4-multimodal technical report 6.39 RTVLM (public), 0 to 10, higher is safer (Table 15) Safety
30 Aug 2024 Phi-3.5-vision-instruct technical report 5.44 RTVLM (public), 0 to 10, higher is better (Table 7) Safety

More in Safety and alignment

All 444 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
  • MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy. Muse Spark Open 98.1%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. GPT-6 Astra 8.50%
  • Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%