Benchmark Almanac

RTP-LX

Not in model cards

Models continue or judge toxic prompts hand-translated from RealToxicityPrompts into dozens of languages, with native-speaker labels. Measures toxic output and toxicity detection.

AAAI 2025. The paper covers 28 languages and the repo now lists 38. Microsoft reported Phi-3.5 results on it in its Phi-3 safety post-training paper.

In the authors’ words

Large language models (LLMs) and small language models (SLMs) are being adopted at remarkable speed, although their safety still remains a serious concern. With the advent of multilingual S/LLMs, the question now becomes a matter of scale: can we expand multilingual safety evaluations of these models with the same velocity at which they are deployed? To this end, we introduce RTP-LX, a human-transcreated and human-annotated corpus of toxic prompts and outputs in 28 languages. RTP-LX follows participatory design practices, and a portion of the corpus is especially designed to detect culturally-specific toxic language. We evaluate 10 S/LLMs on their ability to detect toxic content in a culturally-sensitive, multilingual scenario. We find that, although they typically score acceptably in terms of accuracy, they have low agreement with human judges when scoring holistically the toxicity of a prompt; and have difficulty discerning harm in context-dependent scenarios, particularly with subtle-yet-harmful content (e.g. microaggressions, bias). We release this dataset to contribute to further reduce harmful uses of these models and improve their safe deployment.

Abstract of RTP-LX: Can LLMs Evaluate Toxicity in Multilingual Scenarios? (arXiv:2404.14397, CC0)
Made by Microsoft (de Wynter et al.) Released Apr 2024 Bias, fairness and politics All tasks public
Level
Everyday Most adults, without training
Scored
Graded by a model A language model scores each response, usually against a rubric.
Answers
Open-ended Free-form text, documents, designs or media judged as a whole.

No scores here yet

No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for RTP-LX yet.

No lab model card reports it yet

We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark.

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