Benchmark Almanac

RealToxicityPrompts

Apertus 70B 0.20% Only in system cards

Models continue 100,000 web text prompts. Scored on the rate of toxic generations judged by a toxicity classifier.

Labs use different classifiers and sampling, so rates rarely compare across reports.

In the authors’ words

Pretrained neural language models (LMs) are prone to generating racist, sexist, or otherwise toxic language which hinders their safe deployment. We investigate the extent to which pretrained LMs can be prompted to generate toxic language, and the effectiveness of controllable text generation algorithms at preventing such toxic degeneration. We create and release RealToxicityPrompts, a dataset of 100K naturally occurring, sentence-level prompts derived from a large corpus of English web text, paired with toxicity scores from a widely-used toxicity classifier. Using RealToxicityPrompts, we find that pretrained LMs can degenerate into toxic text even from seemingly innocuous prompts. We empirically assess several controllable generation methods, and find that while data- or compute-intensive methods (e.g., adaptive pretraining on non-toxic data) are more effective at steering away from toxicity than simpler solutions (e.g., banning "bad" words), no current method is failsafe against neural toxic degeneration. To pinpoint the potential cause of such persistent toxic degeneration, we analyze two web text corpora used to pretrain several LMs (including GPT-2; Radford et. al, 2019), and find a significant amount of offensive, factually unreliable, and otherwise toxic content. Our work provides a test bed for evaluating toxic generations by LMs and stresses the need for better data selection processes for pretraining.

Abstract of RealToxicityPrompts: Evaluating Neural Toxic Degeneration in Language Models (arXiv:2009.11462, CC0)
Made by Allen Institute for AI and University of Washington Released Sep 2020 Refusing harmful requests All tasks public Last in a system card Sep 2025 Last model added Sep 2025
Level
Everyday Most adults, without training
Scored
Graded by a model A language model scores each response, usually against a rubric.
Answers
Open-ended Free-form text, documents, designs or media judged as a whole.
2
Models scored in lab cards
6
System cards report it, from 3 labs

Apertus 70B leads with 0.20%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Apertus 70B 0.20%
  2. 2 GPT-4 Mar 2023 0.73%
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Apertus 70B 0.20% Sep 2025 Model card
2 GPT-4 Mar 2023 0.73% Mar 2023 Model card

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card Best so far
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2023 2024 2025 Apertus 70B GPT-4 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2023 2024 2025 Apertus 70B GPT-4

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

6 system cards report it, from 3 labs

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
17 Sep 2025 Apertus 70B technical report 0.2 RealToxicityPrompts LlaMA-Guard3 Subsampled, a 10% subsample with a Llama-Guard-3-8B classifier, lower is better (Table 26) Safety
31 Jul 2024 Gemma 2 9B technical report 8.25 RealToxicity, avg tox (lower is better), IT (Table 18) Safety
31 Jul 2024 Gemma 2 27B technical report 8.84 RealToxicity, avg tox (lower is better), IT (Table 18) Safety
13 Mar 2024 Gemma 7B technical report 7.9 RealToxicity, average toxicity (lower is better), IT (Table 8) Safety
13 Mar 2024 Gemma 2B technical report 6.86 RealToxicity, average toxicity (lower is better), IT (Table 8) Safety
14 Mar 2023 GPT-4 technical report 0.73 RealToxicityPrompts, toxic generations rate (6) Safety

More in Safety and alignment

All 444 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
  • MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy. Muse Spark Open 98.1%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. GPT-6 Astra 8.50%
  • Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%