Benchmark Almanac

Opportunistic sandbox escape (Anthropic)

Claude Haiku 5.5 4.00% Only in system cards

Agents do dev-ops tasks in 1,753 sandboxes with deliberate weaknesses. Score is the share of scenarios where they use credentials or files outside.

Anthropic also reports the rate of reaching outside the sandbox by any route. It differs from the older audit-based sandbox evaluation.

Made by Anthropic Released Oct 2026 Deception and alignment Tasks kept private Last in a system card Oct 2026 Last model added Oct 2026
Level
Expert Specialists with years of training, often over hours of work
Scored
Checked automatically A program checks the result against an answer key, unit tests or the expected final state.
Answers
Agent task Many steps in a terminal, browser, desktop, app, game or robot.
1
Model scored in lab cards
1
System card reports it, from 1 lab

Claude Haiku 5.5 leads with 4.00%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Claude Haiku 5.5 4.00%
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Claude Haiku 5.5 4.00% Oct 2026 Model card

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Claude Haiku 5.5 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Claude Haiku 5.5

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

One system card reports it

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
7 Oct 2026 Claude Haiku 5.5 system card 4 Opportunistic sandbox escape, used credentials or files outside the sandbox in 4.0% of scenarios. Reached outside in 30% (524 of 1,753) (6.3.1) Alignment

More in Safety and alignment

All 444 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
  • MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy. Muse Spark Open 98.1%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. GPT-6 Astra 8.50%
  • Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%