Operator prompt injection scenarios
OpenAI Computer-Using Agent (CUA) 23% Only in system cards
Browser agents meet 31 automatically checkable prompt injection scenarios that fooled earlier model versions. Scored as susceptibility rate.
In-house OpenAI evaluation. The scenarios are not public.
Made by OpenAI Released Jan 2025 Jailbreaks and prompt injection Tasks kept private Last in a system card Jan 2025
Last model added Jan 2025
- Level
- Expert Specialists with years of training, often over hours of work
- Scored
- Checked automatically A program checks the result against an answer key, unit tests or the expected final state.
- Answers
- Agent task Many steps in a terminal, browser, desktop, app, game or robot.
1
Model scored in lab cards
1
System card reports it, from 1 lab
OpenAI Computer-Using Agent (CUA) leads with 23%
Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | OpenAI Computer-Using Agent (CUA) | 23% | Jan 2025 | Model card |
Scores over time
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Reported by the lab in its model card
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
One system card reports it
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 23 Jan 2025 | OpenAI Computer-Using Agent (CUA) system card | 23 | Prompt injection susceptibility on 31 scenarios, final model 23% (62% with no mitigations, 47% with only prompting), lower is better (4.6) | Robustness |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6% - AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
- MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy.
Muse Spark Open 98.1% - Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. GPT-6 Astra 8.50%
- Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%