Benchmark Almanac

OpenAI monitorability evals

Only in system cards

Open suite from 'Monitoring Monitorability' testing whether CoT and action monitors catch hidden properties of agent behavior.

In the authors’ words

Observability into the decision making of modern AI systems may be required to safely deploy increasingly capable agents. Monitoring the chain-of-thought (CoT) of today's reasoning models has proven effective for detecting misbehavior. However, this "monitorability" may be fragile under different training procedures, data sources, or even continued system scaling. To measure and track monitorability, we propose three evaluation archetypes (intervention, process, and outcome-property) and a new monitorability metric, and introduce a broad evaluation suite. We demonstrate that these evaluations can catch simple model organisms trained to have obfuscated CoTs, and that CoT monitoring is more effective than action-only monitoring in practical settings. We compare the monitorability of various frontier models and find that most models are fairly, but not perfectly, monitorable. We also evaluate how monitorability scales with inference-time compute, reinforcement learning optimization, and pre-training model size. We find that longer CoTs are generally more monitorable and that RL optimization does not materially decrease monitorability even at the current frontier scale. Notably, we find that for a model at a low reasoning effort, we could instead deploy a smaller model at a higher reasoning effort (thereby matching capabilities) and obtain a higher monitorability, albeit at a higher overall inference compute cost. We further investigate agent-monitor scaling trends and find that scaling a weak monitor's test-time compute when monitoring a strong agent increases monitorability. Giving the weak monitor access to CoT not only improves monitorability, but it steepens the monitor's test-time compute to monitorability scaling trend. Finally, we show we can improve monitorability by asking models follow-up questions and giving their follow-up CoT to the monitor.

Abstract of Monitoring Monitorability (arXiv:2512.18311, CC0)
Made by OpenAI Released Dec 2025 Deception and alignment All tasks public Last in a system card Oct 2026 Last model added Oct 2026
Scored
Checked automatically A program checks the result against an answer key, unit tests or the expected final state.
Answers
Open-ended Free-form text, documents, designs or media judged as a whole.
2
System cards report it, from 2 labs

No scores here yet

No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for OpenAI monitorability evals yet.

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

2 system cards report it, from 2 labs

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
23 Oct 2026 Muse Spark 1.3 system card 0.75 Monitoring Monitorability suite, aggregate g-mean2 CoT-only monitor at high effort, Muse Spark 1.3 (API), four environments (Figure 19 text) Monitorability
28 May 2026 Claude Opus 4.8 system card Monitorability evaluations from Guan et al., process monitorability on GPQA physics and AIME, theorem detection rate across effort levels, chart without printed values. Intervention-based evaluations not reported (6.5.2, Figure 6.5.2.A) Monitorability

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