Benchmark Almanac

OAI-repo Sabotage v2

Only in system cards

Agents try to complete a hidden sabotage side task in OpenAI code without detection. Scored on side task success while evading CoT and action monitors.

In-house OpenAI monitorability evaluation. Results appear as charts by reasoning length.

Made by OpenAI Released Sep 2026 Deception and alignment Tasks kept private Last in a system card Sep 2026 Last model added Sep 2026
Level
Expert Specialists with years of training, often over hours of work
Scored
Graded by a model A language model scores each response, usually against a rubric.
Answers
Agent task Many steps in a terminal, browser, desktop, app, game or robot.
3
System cards report it, from 1 lab

No scores here yet

No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for OAI-repo Sabotage v2 yet.

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

3 system cards report it, from 1 lab

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
29 Sep 2026 GPT-6.1 Sol system card addendum OAI-repo Sabotage v2, monitor evasion under task-guided and unguided sabotage, charts without printed numbers (Figures 21, 22) Monitorability
22 Sep 2026 GPT-6 Sol system card OAI-repo Sabotage v2, monitor evasion, charts without printed numbers (Figures 74, 75, A.7.1.2) Monitorability
3 Sep 2026 GPT-6 Astra system card OAI-repo Sabotage v2, monitor evasion under task-guided and unguided sabotage, charts without printed numbers (Figures 31, 32) Monitorability

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