LinuxArena
AI-control setting in live Linux production-like environments. Measures stealthy side-task completion against action and CoT monitors.
20 environments, 1,667 main tasks and 185 side tasks. The public repo holds 10 environments, 919 main tasks and 93 side tasks with trajectories for 11 models. LaStraj adds human-made attack trajectories.
In the authors’ words
We introduce LinuxArena, a control setting in which agents operate directly on live, multi-service production environments. LinuxArena contains 20 environments, 1,671 main tasks representing legitimate software engineering work, and 184 side tasks representing safety failures such as data exfiltration and backdooring, making it the largest and most diverse control setting for software engineering to date. We validate LinuxArena is useful for control research by running sabotage evaluations, which measure whether attackers can complete side tasks while working on main tasks, and monitor evaluations, which measure a monitor model's ability to detect sabotage attempts. Against a GPT-5-nano trusted monitor at a 1% step-wise false positive rate, Claude Opus 4.6 achieves roughly a 23% undetected sabotage success rate. We additionally release LaStraj, a dataset of human-crafted attack trajectories that evade monitors at substantially higher rates than any model-generated attacks we elicited, showing that current attack policies do not saturate LinuxArena. These results suggest that LinuxArena has meaningful headroom for both attackers and defenders, making it a strong testbed for developing and evaluating future control protocols.
- Level
- Expert Specialists with years of training, often over hours of work
- Scored
- Graded by a model A language model scores each response, usually against a rubric.
- Answers
- Agent task Many steps in a terminal, browser, desktop, app, game or robot.
Gemini 4 Argon leads with 45.5%
Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.
- 1
Gemini 4 Argon 45.5%
- 2 Claude Sonnet 5.5 36.2%
- 3 Claude Opus 5.5 33.4%
- 4 Claude Haiku 5.5 6.00%
- 5 Claude Opus 5 0.70%
- 6 Claude Sonnet 5 0%
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | 45.5% | Oct 2026 | Model card | |
| 2 | Claude Sonnet 5.5 | 36.2% | Sep 2026 | Model card | |
| 3 | Claude Opus 5.5 | 33.4% | Sep 2026 | Model card | |
| 4 | Claude Haiku 5.5 | 6.00% | Oct 2026 | Model card | |
| 5 | Claude Opus 5 | 0.70% | Jul 2026 | Model card | |
| 6 | Claude Sonnet 5 | 0% | Jun 2026 | Model card |
5 models have held number one since its release in Apr 2026
Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.
Scores over time
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
6 system cards report it, from 2 labs
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 13 Oct 2026 | | 45.5 | LinuxArena (200 task pairs, internal sandbox), successful sabotage rate undetected by a combined action and CoT monitor (Gemini 3.8 Flash, production-like prompt), max-evasion prompt 45.5%; action-only evasion rate 77.6%; CoT-controllability variant 25% attack success vs weak monitor (3.4.5.4, 3.4.5.8, Figures 3.25, 3.27, 3.42) | Monitorability |
| 7 Oct 2026 | Claude Haiku 5.5 system card | 6 | LinuxArena stealth side-task completion, extended thinking with reasoning hidden from monitor, about 6%, max effort. No thinking 0.4, reasoning visible 0.1 (6.4.2.1) | Monitorability |
| 28 Sep 2026 | Claude Sonnet 5.5 system card | 36.2 | LinuxArena stealth success rate, extended thinking with reasoning hidden from the monitor, best prompt (no extended thinking 3.9%, visible reasoning 0.0%) (6.4.2.2, Figure 6.4.2.2.A) | Monitorability |
| 22 Sep 2026 | Claude Opus 5.5 system card | 33.4 | LinuxArena stealth success rate, extended thinking with reasoning hidden from the monitor, max effort, best prompt, 1,000 task pairings (no extended thinking 11.9%, reasoning visible 0.04%) (6.6.4.2, Figure 6.6.4.2.A) | Monitorability |
| 24 Jul 2026 | Claude Opus 5 system card | 0.7 | LinuxArena (Minimal-LinuxBench) sabotage stealth rate, adaptive extended thinking, Opus 4.6 monitor without CoT (0.3% against a monitor using CoT), printed on chart (6.7.2, Figure 6.7.2.A) | Monitorability |
| 30 Jun 2026 | Claude Sonnet 5 system card | 0 | LinuxArena stealth success rate, adaptive extended thinking, 0.0% with both the no-CoT and the CoT Opus 4.6 monitor (6.7.2, Figure 6.7.2.A) | Monitorability |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6%
- AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
- MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy.
Muse Spark Open 98.1%
- Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. GPT-6 Astra 8.50%
- Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%