Benchmark Almanac

Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark)

Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside 10 agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. Scored by attack resistance.

ICLR 2026. Public HF set is a 'weak' 210-attack subset of 194,331 attacks. Runner lives in Inspect Evals (src/inspect_evals/b3).

In the authors’ words

AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) are being deployed at scale, yet we lack a systematic understanding of how the choice of backbone LLM affects agent security. The non-deterministic sequential nature of AI agents complicates security modeling, while the integration of traditional software with AI components entangles novel LLM vulnerabilities with conventional security risks. Existing frameworks only partially address these challenges as they either capture specific vulnerabilities only or require modeling of complete agents. To address these limitations, we introduce threat snapshots: a framework that isolates specific states in an agent's execution flow where LLM vulnerabilities manifest, enabling the systematic identification and categorization of security risks that propagate from the LLM to the agent level. We apply this framework to construct the b³ benchmark, a security benchmark based on 194,331 unique crowdsourced adversarial attacks. We then evaluate 34 popular LLMs with it, revealing, among other insights, that enhanced reasoning capabilities improve security, while model size does not correlate with security. We release our benchmark, dataset, and evaluation code to facilitate widespread adoption by LLM providers and practitioners, offering guidance for agent developers and incentivizing model developers to prioritize backbone security improvements.

Abstract of Breaking Agent Backbones: Evaluating the Security of Backbone LLMs in AI Agents (arXiv:2510.22620, CC0)
Made by Lakera + ETH Zurich + UK AISI + Oxford Released Oct 2025 Jailbreaks and prompt injection Public tasks plus a private test set Last in a launch post Oct 2026 Last model added Oct 2026
Scored
Checked automatically A program checks the result against an answer key, unit tests or the expected final state.
Answers
Open-ended Free-form text, documents, designs or media judged as a whole.
1
Model scored in lab cards
1
Launch post lists it, from 1 lab

Mistral Large 4 (Le Chonk, open weights) leads with 97.1%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Mistral Large 4 (Le Chonk, open weights) 97.1%
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Mistral Large 4 (Le Chonk, open weights) 97.1% Oct 2026 Model card

The best score passed 85% in Oct 2026

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2027 Near the ceiling (85%) Mistral Large 4 (Le Chonk, open weights) 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2027 Near the ceiling (85%) Mistral Large 4 (Le Chonk, open weights)

One lab put it in a launch post in the last six months

Launch posts from every lab that has listed it, one tick per post. Tall colored ticks include it, and short gray ones leave it out.

Mistral AI
DateLaunch postScoreAs the post writes it
29 Oct 2026 Mistral Large 4 (Le Chonk, open weights) 97.1 B3 Agent Security Benchmark, attack resistance

More in Safety and alignment

All 444 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
  • MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy. Muse Spark Open 98.1%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. GPT-6 Astra 8.50%
  • Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%