Harmful manipulation propensity evaluation
Gemini 3.7 Flash 21.3% Only in system cards Simulated users talk with the model and an autorater counts how often it uses manipulative mechanisms, with and without persuasion instructions.
In-house Google DeepMind evaluation built on El-Sayed et al. 2024 mechanisms.
- Level
- Everyday Most adults, without training
- Scored
- Graded by a model A language model scores each response, usually against a rubric.
- Answers
- Open-ended Free-form text, documents, designs or media judged as a whole.
Gemini 3.7 Flash leads with 21.3%
Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.
- 1 Gemini 3.7 Flash 21.3%
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Gemini 3.7 Flash | 21.3% | Aug 2026 | Model card |
Scores over time
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
3 system cards report it, from 1 lab
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 13 Oct 2026 | Gemini 4 Argon system card | Propensity evaluation with synthetic users, adversarial condition, share of turns with manipulative cues, two topic sets with no overall: lower-stakes 43.1%, higher-stakes 78.0% (Model A checkpoint, 3.2.3.3) | Persuasion | |
| 13 Aug 2026 | Gemini 3.7 Flash system card | 21.3 | Propensity evaluation, adversarial condition, share of turns with manipulative cues, lower-stakes scenarios. Higher-stakes = 53.3% (Propensity Evaluation, Results, p.24) | Persuasion |
| 18 Nov 2025 | Gemini 3 Pro system card | Propensity evaluation: manipulative cues more frequent than Gemini 2.5 Pro in control and adversarial conditions, no rate printed (Harmful Manipulation, p.12) | Persuasion |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6% - AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
- MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy.
Muse Spark Open 98.1% - Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. GPT-6 Astra 8.50%
- Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%