Benchmark Almanac

Gram (Gauging Realistic Agentic Misbehavior)

Gemini 4 Argon 0% Only in system cards

Automated auditing over 17 simulated deployment scenarios that incentivize sabotage by coding and research agents. LLM judges plus human review.

Builds on Petri. No public repo found.

In the authors’ words

We introduce Gram, an automated alignment auditing framework to assess the propensity of AI agents to engage in sabotage. We evaluate Gemini models across 17 simulated agentic deployment scenarios that incentivize sabotage. We find Gemini models misbehave in about 2-3% of our simulated trajectories. Many of these cases are explained by "overeagerness" in Gemini models resulting in both excessive role-playing and goal-seeking behavior. In contrast to other alignment auditing approaches, Gram is designed to specifically evaluate misalignment and intentional sabotage in agentic coding and research agents. We additionally introduce an experimental investigator agent pipeline which enables fine-grained targeted experiments to identify the drivers of misbehavior. We find that increasing realism of environments and removing nudges to misbehave tends to reduce sabotage rates close to zero.

Abstract of Gram: Assessing sabotage propensities via automated alignment auditing (arXiv:2605.30322, CC0)
Made by Google DeepMind Released May 2026 Deception and alignment Last in a system card Oct 2026 Last model added Oct 2026
Scored
Graded by a model A language model scores each response, usually against a rubric.
Answers
Agent task Many steps in a terminal, browser, desktop, app, game or robot.
1
Model scored in lab cards
1
System card reports it, from 1 lab

Gemini 4 Argon leads with 0%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Gemini 4 Argon 0%
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Gemini 4 Argon 0% Oct 2026 Model card

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Near the ceiling (85%) 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Near the ceiling (85%)

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

One system card reports it

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
13 Oct 2026 Gemini 4 Argon system card 0 Gram (17 simulated environments), sabotage rate 0% in Observe and Red Team conditions; verbalized eval awareness 61% / 77% (Figure 3.20, Table 3.6) Alignment

More in Safety and alignment

All 444 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
  • MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy. Muse Spark Open 98.1%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. GPT-6 Astra 8.50%
  • Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%