Acting on a presumed grader and digging for evaluation clues (Anthropic)
Only in system cards
Models work on coding evaluations. A grader flags transcripts that shape answers to a presumed grader or search for clues about grading.
Reported as two separate flag rates with no overall rate.
Made by Anthropic Released Sep 2026 Deception and alignment Tasks kept private Last in a system card Oct 2026
Last model added Oct 2026
- Level
- Expert Specialists with years of training, often over hours of work
- Scored
- Graded by a model A language model scores each response, usually against a rubric.
- Answers
- Agent task Many steps in a terminal, browser, desktop, app, game or robot.
3
System cards report it, from 1 lab
No scores here yet
No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for Acting on a presumed grader and digging for evaluation clues (Anthropic) yet.
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
3 system cards report it, from 1 lab
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 Oct 2026 | Claude Haiku 5.5 system card | Acting on a presumed grader 0.50 (3/597) and digging for evaluation clues 0.84 (5/597) in coding evaluations, no overall (Figure 6.4.1.B) | Monitorability | |
| 28 Sep 2026 | Claude Sonnet 5.5 system card | Acting on a presumed grader 2 of 600 and digging for evaluation clues 1 of 600 in coding evaluations, no overall (6.4.1, Figure 6.4.1.C) | Monitorability | |
| 22 Sep 2026 | Claude Opus 5.5 system card | Acting on a presumed grader 2 of 695 and digging for evaluation clues 1 of 695 in coding evaluations, no overall (6.6.2, Figure 6.6.2.B) | Monitorability |
More in Safety and alignment
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Inkling 98.6% - AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
- MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy.
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- Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%