Benchmark Almanac

Self-proliferation challenges (Phuong et al. 2024)

Gemma 2 27B 0% Only in system cards

Agents try 10 end-to-end tasks such as installing a wallet or deploying a model on a cloud server, with 45 milestone substeps.

Reports give challenges passed end to end, milestones passed and expert bits needed.

In the authors’ words

To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security; (3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.

Abstract of Evaluating Frontier Models for Dangerous Capabilities (arXiv:2403.13793, CC0)
Made by Google DeepMind Released Mar 2024 Dangerous capabilities All tasks public Last in a system card Jul 2024 Last model added Jul 2024
Level
Expert Specialists with years of training, often over hours of work
Scored
Checked automatically A program checks the result against an answer key, unit tests or the expected final state.
Answers
Agent task Many steps in a terminal, browser, desktop, app, game or robot.
1
Model scored in lab cards
1
System card reports it, from 1 lab

Gemma 2 27B leads with 0%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Gemma 2 27B 0%
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Gemma 2 27B 0% Jul 2024 Model card

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Near the ceiling (85%) 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Near the ceiling (85%)

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

One system card reports it

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
31 Jul 2024 Gemma 2 27B technical report 0 Self-proliferation, challenges passed end-to-end 0/10 (Table 21). Challenges with success on all milestones 1/10, total milestones 22/45 (49%), expert bits 12,462 Autonomy

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