Benchmark Almanac

DTap Prompt Injection

Muse Spark 1.3 17.5% Only in system cards

An attacker agent plants indirect prompt injections in tool and browser environments against a benign-user agent. Reports attack success rate.

Indirect-injection subset of the DecodingTrust-Agent Platform. 58 tool-use and 42 browser-use tasks.

In the authors’ words

AI agents are increasingly deployed across diverse domains to automate complex workflows through long-horizon and high-stakes action executions. Due to their high capability and flexibility, such agents raise significant security and safety concerns. A growing number of real-world incidents have shown that adversaries can easily manipulate agents into performing harmful actions, such as leaking API keys, deleting user data, or initiating unauthorized transactions. Evaluating agent security is inherently challenging, as agents operate in dynamic, untrusted environments involving external tools, heterogeneous data sources, and frequent user interactions. However, realistic, controllable, and reproducible environments for large-scale risk assessment remain largely underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce the DecodingTrust-Agent Platform (DTap), the first controllable and interactive red-teaming platform for AI agents, spanning 14 real-world domains and over 50 simulation environments that replicate widely used systems such as Google Workspace, Paypal, and Slack. To scale the risk assessment of agents in DTap, we further propose DTap-Red, the first autonomous red-teaming agent that systematically explores diverse injection vectors (e.g., prompt, tool, skill, environment, combinations) and autonomously discovers effective attack strategies tailored to varying malicious goals. Using DTap-Red, we curate DTap-Bench, a large-scale red-teaming dataset comprising high-quality instances across domains, each paired with a verifiable judge to automatically validate attack outcomes. Through DTap, we conduct large-scale evaluations of popular AI agents built on various backbone models, spanning security policies, risk categories, and attack strategies, revealing systematic vulnerability patterns and providing valuable insights for developing secure next-generation agents.

Abstract of DecodingTrust-Agent Platform (DTap): A Controllable and Interactive Red-Teaming Platform for AI Agents (arXiv:2605.04808, CC0)
Made by UIUC Secure Learning Lab (AI Secure, DecodingTrust team) Released May 2026 Jailbreaks and prompt injection All tasks public Last in a system card Oct 2026 Last model added Oct 2026
Level
Expert Specialists with years of training, often over hours of work
Scored
Graded by a model A language model scores each response, usually against a rubric.
Answers
Agent task Many steps in a terminal, browser, desktop, app, game or robot.
1
Model scored in lab cards
1
System card reports it, from 1 lab

Muse Spark 1.3 leads with 17.5%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Muse Spark 1.3 17.5%
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Muse Spark 1.3 17.5% Oct 2026 Model card

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2027 Muse Spark 1.3 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2027 Muse Spark 1.3

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

One system card reports it

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
23 Oct 2026 Muse Spark 1.3 system card 17.5 DTap Prompt Injection, browser-use IPI pass@1 ASR, Muse Spark 1.3 (API) (Table 2, Figure 29). Tool-use subset 4.0 Robustness

More in Safety and alignment

All 444 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
  • MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy. Muse Spark Open 98.1%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. GPT-6 Astra 8.50%
  • Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%