Benchmark Almanac

DoAnythingNow (DAN)

Olmo 3.1 32B Think 54.7% Only in system cards

Models face in-the-wild DAN-style jailbreak prompts paired with forbidden questions. Scored by refusal rate or attack success rate.

The paper collects 1,405 jailbreak prompts and 107,250 questions in 13 forbidden scenarios. Ai2 uses a 300-prompt subsample paired with HarmBench behaviors.

In the authors’ words

The misuse of large language models (LLMs) has drawn significant attention from the general public and LLM vendors. One particular type of adversarial prompt, known as jailbreak prompt, has emerged as the main attack vector to bypass the safeguards and elicit harmful content from LLMs. In this paper, employing our new framework JailbreakHub, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of 1,405 jailbreak prompts spanning from December 2022 to December 2023. We identify 131 jailbreak communities and discover unique characteristics of jailbreak prompts and their major attack strategies, such as prompt injection and privilege escalation. We also observe that jailbreak prompts increasingly shift from online Web communities to prompt-aggregation websites and 28 user accounts have consistently optimized jailbreak prompts over 100 days. To assess the potential harm caused by jailbreak prompts, we create a question set comprising 107,250 samples across 13 forbidden scenarios. Leveraging this dataset, our experiments on six popular LLMs show that their safeguards cannot adequately defend jailbreak prompts in all scenarios. Particularly, we identify five highly effective jailbreak prompts that achieve 0.95 attack success rates on ChatGPT (GPT-3.5) and GPT-4, and the earliest one has persisted online for over 240 days. We hope that our study can facilitate the research community and LLM vendors in promoting safer and regulated LLMs.

Abstract of "Do Anything Now": Characterizing and Evaluating In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts on Large Language Models (arXiv:2308.03825, CC0)
Made by CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security (Xinyue Shen, Yang Zhang and others) Released Aug 2023 Jailbreaks and prompt injection All tasks public Last in a system card Dec 2025 Last model added Dec 2025
Level
Everyday Most adults, without training
Scored
Graded by a model A language model scores each response, usually against a rubric.
Answers
Open-ended Free-form text, documents, designs or media judged as a whole.
2
Models scored in lab cards
2
System cards report it, from 1 lab

Olmo 3.1 32B Think leads with 54.7%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Olmo 3.1 32B Think 54.7%
  2. 2 Olmo 3 32B Think 20.2%
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Olmo 3.1 32B Think 54.7% Dec 2025 Model card
2 Olmo 3 32B Think 20.2% Dec 2025 Model card

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2026 Near the ceiling (85%) Olmo 3.1 32B Think 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2026 Near the ceiling (85%) Olmo 3.1 32B Think

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

2 system cards report it, from 1 lab

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
15 Dec 2025 Olmo 3 32B Think technical report 20.2 DoAnythingNow, refusal accuracy, Final Think 3.0 column (Table 54) Safety
15 Dec 2025 Olmo 3.1 32B Think technical report 54.7 DoAnythingNow, refusal accuracy, Final Think 3.1 column (Table 54) Safety

More in Safety and alignment

All 444 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
  • MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy. Muse Spark Open 98.1%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. GPT-6 Astra 8.50%
  • Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%