Discrim-Eval
Models make yes or no decisions in templated scenarios that vary age, gender and race. Scored by mixed effects model coefficients.
OpenAI reports normalized coefficients for explicit and implicit demographic mentions. Lower means less bias.
In the authors’ words
As language models (LMs) advance, interest is growing in applying them to high-stakes societal decisions, such as determining financing or housing eligibility. However, their potential for discrimination in such contexts raises ethical concerns, motivating the need for better methods to evaluate these risks. We present a method for proactively evaluating the potential discriminatory impact of LMs in a wide range of use cases, including hypothetical use cases where they have not yet been deployed. Specifically, we use an LM to generate a wide array of potential prompts that decision-makers may input into an LM, spanning 70 diverse decision scenarios across society, and systematically vary the demographic information in each prompt. Applying this methodology reveals patterns of both positive and negative discrimination in the Claude 2.0 model in select settings when no interventions are applied. While we do not endorse or permit the use of language models to make automated decisions for the high-risk use cases we study, we demonstrate techniques to significantly decrease both positive and negative discrimination through careful prompt engineering, providing pathways toward safer deployment in use cases where they may be appropriate. Our work enables developers and policymakers to anticipate, measure, and address discrimination as language model capabilities and applications continue to expand. We release our dataset and prompts at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Anthropic/discrim-eval
- Level
- Everyday Most adults, without training
- Scored
- Graded by a model A language model scores each response, usually against a rubric.
- Answers
- Short answer A number, word or short string matched to a key.
No scores here yet
No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for Discrim-Eval yet.
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
7 system cards report it, from 2 labs
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31 Jan 2025 | o3-mini system card | Discrimination Evaluation Scores, explicit and implicit discrimination overall coefficients, no single overall score (Table 18, Appendix 8.2) | Bias | |
| 5 Dec 2024 | o1 system card | Discrimination Evaluation Scores, explicit and implicit overall average coefficients, no single overall score (Table 25, 8.4) | Bias | |
| 12 Sep 2024 | o1-preview system card | Discrimination Evaluation Scores, explicit and implicit overall average coefficients, no single overall score (Table 18, 8.6) | Bias | |
| 12 Sep 2024 | o1-mini system card | Discrimination Evaluation Scores, explicit and implicit overall average coefficients, no single overall score (Table 18, 8.6) | Bias | |
| 4 Mar 2024 | Claude 3 Sonnet model card | Discrimination score per demographic group and average magnitude, chart without printed values (7.3.1, Figure 19) | Bias | |
| 4 Mar 2024 | Claude 3 Opus model card | Discrimination score per demographic group and average magnitude, chart without printed values (7.3.1, Figure 19) | Bias | |
| 4 Mar 2024 | Claude 3 Haiku model card | Discrimination score per demographic group and average magnitude, chart without printed values (7.3.1, Figure 20) | Bias |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6%
- AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
- MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy.
Muse Spark Open 98.1%
- Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. GPT-6 Astra 8.50%
- Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%