Benchmark Almanac

DecepEval

Not in model cards

LLM agents pursue tasks across varied scenarios and conditions, and judges detect when they use deception to improve task performance.

47 upvotes on Hugging Face papers.

In the authors’ words

As large language model (LLM) agents become increasingly autonomous, they may pursue task performance through deception, raising concerns about their reliable deployment. Existing evaluations show that LLM agents can deceive, but often examine isolated scenarios or narrowly defined conditions, limiting systematic understanding of when deception becomes more likely. To address this gap, we introduce DecepEval, a benchmark comprising 1,532 instances across 3 task families and 28 professional scenarios. Drawing on classical fraud theories, we propose the LLM Deception Diamond framework, which characterizes four external conditions that may induce deception: pressure, incentive, opportunity, and conflict. DecepEval pairs neutral and induced versions of each instance to measure condition-dependent changes in deception rates, while explicit task facts and observable agent behavior help distinguish deception from capability-related errors. Evaluations of nine frontier LLMs show that inducements increase deception across models and task families, even among models with low baseline deception rates. DecepEval makes these vulnerabilities measurable, providing a shared benchmark for progress toward trustworthy artificial intelligence.

Abstract of DecepEval: A Benchmark for Evaluating Deception in LLM Agents (arXiv:2610.07967, CC0)
Made by Xi'an Jiaotong University Released Oct 2026 Deception and alignment All tasks public
Level
Everyday Most adults, without training
Scored
Graded by a model A language model scores each response, usually against a rubric.
Answers
Agent task Many steps in a terminal, browser, desktop, app, game or robot.

No scores here yet

No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for DecepEval yet.

No lab model card reports it yet

We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark.

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