AgentHarm
110 malicious agent tasks with synthetic tools. Measures refusal and harmful task completion, plus benign controls.
Implemented in Inspect Evals. Part of the test set is private.
In the authors’ words
The robustness of LLMs to jailbreak attacks, where users design prompts to circumvent safety measures and misuse model capabilities, has been studied primarily for LLMs acting as simple chatbots. Meanwhile, LLM agents – which use external tools and can execute multi-stage tasks – may pose a greater risk if misused, but their robustness remains underexplored. To facilitate research on LLM agent misuse, we propose a new benchmark called AgentHarm. The benchmark includes a diverse set of 110 explicitly malicious agent tasks (440 with augmentations), covering 11 harm categories including fraud, cybercrime, and harassment. In addition to measuring whether models refuse harmful agentic requests, scoring well on AgentHarm requires jailbroken agents to maintain their capabilities following an attack to complete a multi-step task. We evaluate a range of leading LLMs, and find (1) leading LLMs are surprisingly compliant with malicious agent requests without jailbreaking, (2) simple universal jailbreak templates can be adapted to effectively jailbreak agents, and (3) these jailbreaks enable coherent and malicious multi-step agent behavior and retain model capabilities. To enable simple and reliable evaluation of attacks and defenses for LLM-based agents, we publicly release AgentHarm at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ai-safety-institute/AgentHarm.
- Scored
- Checked automatically A program checks the result against an answer key, unit tests or the expected final state.
- Answers
- Agent task Many steps in a terminal, browser, desktop, app, game or robot.
Fara-7B leads with 94.2% among models released by Apr 2026
Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.
The newest model with a score here came out in Apr 2026, and nobody has reported a newer one. Among the 20 highest-ranked models on the capability index, these have no score yet:
- GPT-6 Astra
- Claude Opus 5.5
- GPT-6.1 Terra
- GPT-6.1 Sol
- and 16 more
- 1
Fara-7B 94.2%
- 2
Muse Spark 26%
- 3 grok-code-fast-1 17%
- 4 Grok 4 14%
- 5 Grok 4.1 14%
- 6 Grok 4 Fast 8.00%
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | 94.2% | Nov 2025 | Model card | |
| 2 | | 26% | Jun 2026 | Model card | |
| 3 | grok-code-fast-1 | 17% | Aug 2025 | Model card | |
| 4 | Grok 4 | 14% | Aug 2025 | Model card | |
| 5 | Grok 4.1 | 14% | Nov 2025 | Model card | |
| 6 | Grok 4 Fast | 8.00% | Sep 2025 | Model card |
3 models have held number one since its release in Oct 2024
Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.
The best score passed 85% in Nov 2025
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 479 launch posts from 51 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
6 system cards report it, from 3 labs
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12 Jun 2026 | | 26 | AgentHarm score (Table 2, Figure 32). Benign subset FRR 6.8 | Robustness |
| 24 Nov 2025 | | 94.2 | AgentHarm-Chat, harmful tasks safely refused (Table 14) | Safety |
| 17 Nov 2025 | Grok 4.1 model card | 14 | AgentHarm, answer rate 0.14, no jailbreak, Grok 4.1 Thinking (Table 1) | Safety |
| 19 Sep 2025 | Grok 4 Fast model card | 8 | AgentHarm, answer rate 0.08, no attack, 0.10 non-reasoning (Table 1) | Safety |
| 26 Aug 2025 | grok-code-fast-1 model card | 17 | AgentHarm, answer rate 17.0 (Table 1) | Safety |
| 20 Aug 2025 | Grok 4 model card | 14 | AgentHarm, answer rate 0.14, no attack, Grok 4 API (Table 1) | Safety |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6%
- AgentDojo In use Agents do tool-use tasks while tools and data carry prompt injections. Attack success rate counts hijacked runs. Grok 4 Fast 0%
- MASK In use Measures whether a model contradicts its own elicited beliefs under pressure to lie. Honesty separated from accuracy.
Muse Spark Open 98.1%
- Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. GPT-6 Astra 8.50%
- Agentic misalignment suite (Anthropic) In use Agents in simulated company settings face threats or goal conflicts that invite blackmail, leaking or sabotage. Score is the misaligned action rate. Claude Sonnet 4.5 0%